

Capt Gannon/57672/w 19 Nov 62/

REPLY TO  
ATTN OF: DIAAP-3 001078

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SUBJECT: (U) Intelligence Briefings

23 NOV 1962

TO: Chairman  
U. S. Delegation  
Inter-American Defense Board

1. In response to your memorandum to the Director, Joint Staff, subject as above, dated 9 November 1962, attached hereto for your use is an intelligence roundup of material from 1 November through 18 November 1962. Highest classification of subject matter is SECRET. This roundup includes, but is not limited to, information on Communist activities which affect the defense of the Western Hemisphere.
2. For future requirements request your briefing officer contact Colonel Blake, Acting Chief, CIIC, DIA, Room 2D913, extension OX 77122, for necessary arrangements.

S. B. FRANKEL  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Chief of Staff

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Roundup of Significant  
World Events

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## ROUND-UP OF SIGNIFICANT WORLD EVENTS

### Sino-Soviet-Indian Relations

The USSR last week implicitly warned Peiping not to expect Moscow's support on the Sino-Indian border dispute. Pravda and Izvestiya conveyed the message by supporting a World Peace Council resolution calling for a cease-fire and negotiations on "a mutually acceptable basis." Both papers also carried a number of favorable articles on internal Indian developments, thereby rebutting Peiping's charge that India is an "imperialist stooge" as well as justifying continued Soviet aid.

Amid reports that some families of the Chinese Communist Embassy staff in Moscow have returned home, Tass on 14 November reported the opening of the Indian Consulate in Odessa, only the second non-Elec Consulate in the USSR. |

### Peiping Versus Moscow

Recent events in Communist China indicate that the breach between Moscow and Peiping has widened. The October Revolution anniversary statements by Central Committee member Wu Yu-chang, Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Chen Yi as well as editorial comment in the People's Daily refrained from branding Khrushchev a traitor but came closer than ever before.

Wu suggested that Peiping was considering a complete break with Moscow when he said that the Bolshevik revolution succeeded only because Lenin broke with the "opportunist" of the Second International. He equated world-wide Communist vitality with the vigorous continuation of a policy of revolutionary struggle and active opposition to US imperialism. He also gave Peiping's official stamp of approval to Albania's 13 September attack on Tito as an example of modern revisionism and to Tirana's call for "unmasking" those still in hiding.

At a Soviet reception honoring the October Revolution Anniversary, Chen Yi lent "unreserved support" to Castro's "five just demands" and indicated Soviet policy as vacillating. Chen charged that the absolute rejection of US imperialism is a cornerstone of Communist policy and of such decisive importance that "all revolutionists must take a clear stand without any ambiguity." The People's Daily editorial reiterated Wu's attack in bitter-terms, castigating Tito -- and implicitly those in Moscow -- "who have betrayed the principles of the October Revolution in a . . . despicable manner, to meet the requirements of imperialism."

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Soviet-US Differences Over Autobahn Travel

The Soviets continue to exercise tighter than usual control over US military convoys using the Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn. The Soviet check point commander at Babelsberg on 14 November expressed surprise that US convoys of more than five vehicles continued to travel the autobahn without advance notification. He said that lacking prior notice, "future convoys of six or more vehicles -- escorts excepted -- would not be processed under any circumstances "even if the convoy had to wait 10 days".

On 18 October, the Soviets indicated that the US practice of orally notifying checkpoint personnel at least 15 Minutes in advance of convoy movements involving eight or more vehicles was unsatisfactory. They demanded advance notice for all vehicles. This declaration was not challenged during October. Since 1 November, however, four US convoys of six or more vehicles each, testing the Soviet declaration, have been delayed for periods ranging from 18 to 75 minutes.

East German Troubles Hamper Soviets

Although US determination has been the principal deterrent to new Soviet moves in Berlin, East German instability is a significant factor. Economic problems and popular disaffection make the country a weak associate with which to conduct a campaign to expel the Allies from Berlin.

The painful readjustments in the economy throughout 1962 will continue next year and involve considerable industrial dislocation and unemployment. Continuing escape attempts and small-scale strikes attest to the low morale of the people, and the recent introduction of more stringent work norms -- on top of already serious economic troubles -- could have a further unsettling effect. Moreover, within the East German Communist Party itself, there has been a loss of confidence in the regime as a result of Cuban developments.

Soviets Parade New Three-Stage Missile

A new Soviet missile, probably Navy-associated, was displayed in the 7 November Moscow parade. It is probably a 50 to 55-foot three-stage weapon, tapered in a manner somewhat similar to the US Minuteman. Diameters of the stages were reported as about six, five and four feet, respectively, from rocket motor to blunt nose cone.

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This missile probably uses solid fuel as a propellant. If reports of a cluster of seven 10-inch-diameter orifices in the chamber of the rocket motor are correct. From the description of the cluster it must resemble the throat of the FROG I (Free Rocket Over Ground) solid-propellant rocket motor, photographed in last year's parade. Since no fins were seen, aerodynamic control may be achieved by some form of gimbaling of the propulsion system.

#### Air Order of Battle in Cuba

There are indications that the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force (CRAF) is now organized into a single fighter division, probably having three regiments. The estimated total of 60 MIG-15/17/19 aircraft are currently based at San Antonio De Los Banos, and at Camilo Cienfuegos (Santa Clara) and Camaguey airfields. Three MIG-15's were also noted in photography of 4 November at Holguin, a major but heretofore non-operational airfield in eastern Cuba. The CRAF probably has about 100 reasonably well-trained pilots for these aircraft.

In addition to the above, a total of 39 MIG-21's have been observed at three airfields (San Antonio de Los Banos, Camilo Cienfuegos and Camaguey) in quantities and under circumstances strongly indicating that one squadron is based at each field. AA-3 (ATOLL) air-to-air infrared missiles have been installed on a number of these aircraft. A few MIG-21's may be dispersed to other airfields. It is almost certain that practically all of the current MIG-21 pilots are Soviet. Some Cuban pilots, however, are probably undergoing MIG-21 transition training.

The total of 42 IL-28's in various stages of assembly in Cuba are probably also under Soviet control. The principal concentration of these BEAGLE aircraft is at San Julian airfield in western Cuba. Two obviously flyable IL-28's have been observed. Two others are probably flyable, and five more (including one probable trainer version) are in various stages of assembly. Twenty fuselage crates were still on the field on 6 November. The current location of four BEAGLE crates observed at the rail-head near San Julian on 3 November is unknown. Nine other BEAGLE fuselage crates, and many BEAGLE subassembly boxes, were recently observed at Holguin airfield. There is a network of twenty-four (24) surface-to-air missile sites (SAM-2) ringing the island of Cuba.

### Soviet Ground Forces in Cuba

Accumulating evidence indicates that Soviet ground force units are present in Cuba in greater strength than was previously apparent. Analysis of recent photographic coverage of four major military camps in Cuba suggests that they contain highly mobile composite Soviet army ground combat forces of regimental level size, with a possible nuclear capability. These units had earlier been equated to four reinforced medium tank battalions, a FROG artillery rocket battalion, and a SNAPPER antitank missile unit, with a total strength of about 1,200 men. It now seems that these composite groupings contain about 4,000 troops. The presence of Soviet Army units in such strength reflects the extent of Moscow's determination to create and maintain a strategic missile base in Cuba. With the removal of the missile bases, the ground combat units may also be withdrawn, although no preparations for their departure have been noted.

All four of these camps evidently have been established since the beginning of the Soviet build-up in July, and they have certain similarities. While most of their facilities are of a temporary character, construction of permanent buildings similar to those at the missile sites has started. Modern, sophisticated equipment, including types not known to have been released to any non-Soviet units, has been identified at each of these camps. At one -- Santiago de las Vegas -- Soviet Army emblems, including the elite "Guards" unit badge, the armored insignia, and the Red Army Star, have been prominently displayed on the ground at two separate areas.

The disposition of these units also reflects their Soviet identity; all are in areas containing sensitive military installations of prime interest to the Soviets. Three are near the former offensive missile bases, and the fourth is adjacent to the strategically significant airfield at Holguin in eastern Cuba. A runway over 10,000 feet long and underground hangars and storage facilities are being built at this field, suggesting the Soviets planned to base Long Range Aviation bombers and perhaps to store nuclear weapons there.

Since there are some differences in the types and quantities of equipment identified at these camps -- because of camouflage, dispersal and incomplete coverage -- the exact composition and strength of the units has not been established. The pattern, however, appears to be that of a composite, heavily armed grouping consisting of a medium tank battalion, an armored reconnaissance company, an armored infantry unit of company or possibly battalion strength, a multiple rocket launcher battery, a nuclear-capable FROG artillery rocket battalion with two launchers, and a SNAPPER

antitank missile company with about nine triple launchers. At least one of the groupments (Holguin) also includes a 120-mm mortar company with 10 pieces, a 57-mm antitank battery, an anti-aircraft unit with self-propelled twin 30-mm or twin 57-mm guns, and an engineer unit with self-propelled hydraulic bridging equipment. Each of the camps also has one or two emplaced antiaircraft batteries, but these may not be organic to the mobile groupment. A formation of this composition would comprise at least 1,600 to 1,500 men, and possibly as many as 2,500. There are enough tents in the cantonments at Holguin to house more than twice that number of troops under normal field billeting conditions.

Although this structure does not equate exactly with any known Soviet Army formation, the Soviets are known to have been developing regimental task forces in their efforts to adapt to modern warfare. Changes toward this end have been noted in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, where training a recent years has emphasized the employment of a reinforced regimental formation specially designed to conduct independent operations. Combat division headquarters have been used as field commands to co-ordinate and support widely dispersed regimental groupings. The composition and disposition of the Soviet units in Cuba suggests this concept. Except for the absence of towed artillery, these formations resemble in some respects a Soviet motorized rifle division operating as four independent combat commands with attached support elements.

The introduction into Cuba of Soviet ground combat forces is consistent with a capability not only to defend their sensitive installations against invasion, but also to secure them against "counterrevolutionary" activity. Their presence also provides the Soviets a potent source of influence on the internal Cuban scene. Retention of these units in Cuba after the withdrawal of the MRRM's would indicate that Moscow has not abandoned the concept of developing Cuba as a strategic Soviet military base.

**SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT AT MILITARY CAMPS IN CUBA**

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>HOLGUIN</u>	<u>REMEDIOS</u>	<u>SANTIAGO DE LAS VEGAS</u>	<u>ARTEMISA</u>
T-54 tank	30 Pros	33	39	30
SU-100 Assault Gun	9	9	2 Plus	9
SNAPPER AF Missile	10 Poss	9-10 Poss	6 Poss	2 Poss
FROG Launcher	-	1	-	2
FROG Transporter	-	7	8 Poss	5
Armored Personnel Carrier (BTR-50)	7	14	-	2
8-Wheel Personnel Carrier	11 Poss	8 Poss	-	28
Multiple Rocket Launcher	-	5-6	-	5
57-mm AF Gun	2	-	-	5
120-mm Mortar	10	-	-	-
AAA Battery	2	2	1	1

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NOTE: Identification and count of equipment is not necessarily complete in all cases because of activity, dispersal, placing of some vehicles under cover, use of camouflage, and incomplete photo coverage of camp areas.

### Removal of Soviet MRBM's from Cuba

Soviet strategic ballistic missile installations identified in Cuba included six MRBM sites with 24 launch positions, and three IRBM sites with 12 launch positions. A fourth IRBM site with four additional launch positions was believed to have been planned. Some 13 missile transporters were seen at the MRBM sites, as contrasted with the 48 estimated as the normal force level of three regiments to provide a refire capability. The Soviets stated that they had deployed 42 MRBM's to Cuba; the remaining six MRBM's probably were aboard one or more of the Soviet ships which returned to the USSR after the quarantine was imposed. No IRBM's were seen in Cuba; these presumably would have been shipped when construction of the IRBM sites was closer to completion.

A total of 42 MRBM missile transporters and some other missile-associated equipment have been removed from Cuba aboard eight ships. Photographic verification has been obtained of the missiles on these transporters.

In implementing Premier Khrushchev's directive to dismantle the missile bases in Cuba, the Soviets apparently placed top priority on removing the missiles themselves. Sizable quantities of missile-associated equipment remain in Cuban ports awaiting outfitting.

Initial evidence that the sites were being dismantled was obtained by photographic reconnaissance of 1 November. By that date, it was evident that missiles and basic launching equipment had been removed from all of the MRBM launch positions, camouflage taken down, and support vehicles assembled for movement. Construction at the IRBM sites had also ceased, and some of the installations at Guanajay had been destroyed. Reconnaissance since that date has indicated the continuing abandonment of all of these sites, although not all equipment has yet been moved to the ports.

Two loading areas were involved at Mariel -- the City pier and the La Boca pier, about three miles away. Photography shows that there has been some movement of equipment between the piers, and one freighter -- the IVAN POZUNOV -- apparently loaded equipment at both piers. The critical equipment from the four MRBM sites around San Cristobal (25 to 45 miles distant by road) was apparently concentrated at Mariel for outfitting.

The critical equipment from the two MRBM sites at Sagua la Grande apparently was moved south across the island (about 75 miles by road) to Casilda. There is no immediately apparent reason for the selection of Casilda as the port of exit for the Sagua la Grande equipment in preference to the closer north coast ports of La Isabela or Caibarien. Port facilities at La Isabela may have been committed to outfitment of other priority cargo, and the recently improved deep-water port at Casilda may have been more suitable than Caibarien.

The Soviets initially advised that nine ships would carry 42 missiles from Cuba. Their original loading plan apparently was changed, however, since one of these ships (ALAPAYEVSK) carried no missiles. Six ships loaded missiles at Mariel, and two at Casilda. The following table lists the ships involved and the number of missile transporters carried on each:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Ship</u>	<u>Missile Transporters</u>
Mariel:	LABINSK	2
	METALLURG ANGSOV	6
	BRATSK	2
	DIVNOGORSK	4
	VOIAGOLES	7
	IVAN POLZUNOV	5
Casilda:	FIZIK KURCHATOV	6
	LENINGKII KOMSOMOL	8
La Isabela:	ALAPAYEVSK	9
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All of these ships were intercepted at sea by US Naval ships, and compelled with respects to remove the canvas coverings from the missile transporters to permit observation and verification.